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The Style and Substance of Civil
Procedure Reform: Comparison of the
United States and Italy
RICHARD B. CAPPALLI*
I. INTRODUCrION
The United States and Italy have long struggled with delay
and expense in civil cases.' In 1990, both countries approved
major legislation confronting civil delay: the Civil Justice Reform
Act of 19902 in the United States and Law 353 of 19903 in Italy.
While the techniques employed by Italians to improve their
legal system have not been successful, U.S. methodology has
produced a reasonably quick civil justice system in the national
courts. The average U.S. litigant who entered the U.S. courts in
1989 reached the trial courts in fourteen months4 and had a final
appellate judgment ten months later.' In contrast, his Italian
counterpart remains in court for fifteen years. 6 Thus, the "Italian
style"7 seems to have failed, while the "American style" has
* Charles Klein Professor of Law and Government at Temple University; B.A., 1962,
Williams College; J.D., 1965, Columbia University; LL.M., 1972, Yale University.
1. See Edwin M. Lemert, Juvenile Justice Italian Style, 20 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 509,
535-36 (1986) (asserting that there is significant delay in Italian juvenile justice courts).
See generally Oscar G. Chase, Civil Litigation Delay in Italy and the United States, 36 AM.
J. COMP. L. 41 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 101-105, 104 Stat. 5089 (1990) (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
471-482 (1990)).
3. Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL
Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [THE NEW CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE] 45-80
(Giuseppi Vinci ed., 1990).
4. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT
MANAGEMENT STATISTICS (yearly court-by-court judicial workload profiles) [hereinafter
FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS].
5. Id. at 29. Further review by the U.S. Supreme Court occurs too rarely to be
counted.
6. See infra note 30.
7. See John H. Merryman, The Italian Style I: Doctrine, 18 STAN. L. REV. 39 (1965)
[hereinafter Merryman, The Italian Style I]; John H. Merryman, The Italian Style II: Law,
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succeeded. Consequently, the lessons to be learned are mostly for
the Italians.
This Article will compare the elements and style of civil
procedure reform in Italy and the United States. Part II of this
Article discusses civil reform in Italy. First, it describes the
process of procedural reform in Italy and explains the specific rule
amendments. Next, it provides a general analysis of the original
texts that delineate the main actors, how the actors ascertained the
civil justice problems existing in the national court system, and the
methods the actors employed to confront them. Part III of this
Article discusses the U.S. style of civil reform, from the evolution
of the reform statute to the subsequent drafting of particular sets
of procedures aimed at reducing excessive cost and delay. Finally,
Part IV draws general conclusions that may be instructive for
future reformers.
II. ITALIAN CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM: BUILDING FROM THE
TOP DOwN
A. General Observations
The Italian civil justice system resembles the U.S. system in
the abstract.' Cases are filed, proofs are taken, and judgments are
rendered in trial courts (tribunali). Small matters are relegated to
speedier, less formal inferior courts: justices of the peace and
pretori.9 Judgments are appealable to intermediate courts,10 and
questions of jurisdiction and law may be raised to the Supreme
Court (Corte Suprema di Cassazione)." Nevertheless, some
18 STAN. L. REV. 396 (1966); John H. Merryman, The Italian Style III: Interpretation, 18
STAN. L. REV. 583 (1966).
8. For a general discussion of the Italian legal system in the English language, see
MAURO CAPPELLETTI ET AL., THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION (1967);
G. LEROY CERTOMA, THE ITALIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1985). The only English-language
reference work on Italian civil procedure is MAURO CAPPELLETII & JOSEPH M. PERILLO,
CIVIL PROCEDURE IN ITALY (1965). The 1990 Amendments discussed in this Section have
substantially outdated this work. For primary reference works in Italian, see CRISANTO
MANDRIOLI, CORSO DI DIRIrrO PROCESSUALE CIVILE [COURSE IN THE LAW OF CIVIL
PROCESS] (7th ed. 1989); DIRITrO PROCESSUALE CIVILE [LAW OF CIVIL PROCESS]
(Edizioni Simone ed., 6th ed. 1992).
9. See generally SEBASTIANO CORRADO, STATISTICA GUIDIZIARIA [JUDICIAL
STATISTICS] ch. 2 (1986).
10. CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE [C.P.C.] arts. 339-59 (Italy).
11. C.P.C. arts. 360-91.
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significant distinctions exist at the trial level. For example, in Italy
proofs are taken at several hearings, pre-trial discovery is not
authorized, and no civil juries exist.'2
Statutes and executive decrees establish Italian procedural law
and the norms of judicial organization. 3 In contrast, judicial
bodies primarily form procedural law in the United States.14
Italy's basic Code of Civil Procedure15 ("C.PC.") was enacted as
Royal Decree No. 144316 and Royal Decree No. 1368.17 A third
Royal Decree organized the judiciary. 8 Together, these decrees
contain over 1,200 articles that closely regulate every procedural
step and standard. Thus, little is left to the discretion of attorneys
and judges. A dramatic example of this comprehensive regulation
is the article that instructs judges how to write judgments by
specifying the elements to be contained therein. 9
The Italian Parliament has periodically modified this basic
structure. An important amendment occurred in 1973, when
Parliament added special provisions to remove labor disputes from
the increasingly clogged, costly, and time-consuming civil justice
system and to provide a simpler, speedier resolution process.2"
This "fast-track" process exemplifies the major overhaul of 1990
and 1991.21
12. See CAPPELLETTI El AL., supra note 8, at 127-30. Further distinctions between the
two procedural systems will be noted throughout this Article.
13. The Italian procedural codes predate the 1948 Constitution of Italy. Articles 70-77
of the 1948 Constitution require laws to be created by Parliament and, if by the Executive
("Government"), on a non-emergency basis pursuant to specific delegations of authority
from Parliament (decreto-legislativo). See GIANDOMENICO FALCON, DIRrirO PUBLICO
[PUB. L.] 213-16 (2d ed. 1988). Consequently, post-1948 civil procedure in Italy has been
created primarily by Parliament.
14. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1990) ("The Supreme Court shall have the power
to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure ... .
15. C.P.c.
16. Royal Decree of Oct. 28, 1940, No. 1443, Gazz. Uff. No. 253, Oct. 28, 1940 (supp.).
17. Royal Decree of Dec. 18, 1941, No. 1368, Gazz. Uff. No. 302, Dec. 24, 1941 (supp.)
("Implementing and Transitional Provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure").
18. Royal Decree of Jan. 30, 1941, No. 12, Gazz. Uff. No. 28, Feb. 4, 1941.
19. C.P.C. art. 132. The judgment must contain the following: the name of the sen-
tencing judge; the names of parties and attorneys; the arguments of parties and the public
minister; the procedural steps in the case; the factual and legal grounds supporting the
decision; the ruling; the length of the case; and the judge's signature. Id.
20. C.P.C. arts. 409-41, as added by Law of Aug. 11, 1973, No. 533, Gazz. Uff. No. 253,
Oct. 28, 1940.
21. See, e.g., SENATE SECOND PERMANENT COMMrITEE (JUSTICE), 10th Legis., Tran-
script of Session of Jan. 11, 1989, at 64-65 (remarks of Sen. Acone), reprinted in 10
DOCUMENT! GIUSTIZIA [JUDICIAL DOCUMENTS] (Bruno Capponi & Gianfranco Manzo
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B. The Crisis
On November 26, 1990, the Italian Parliament approved a
massive set of amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure.22
This new legislation responded to a profound crisis in the Italian
civil justice system.'
Unfortunately, no materials document the professed crisis.
While the Italian government maintains records of gross figures
regarding caseloads,24 background materials do not document
where, how, and why the system was crumbling. In thousands of
pages of primary' and secondary materials, 26 one finds a near
eds. 1991).
22. Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL
Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 45-80.
23. See Giuliano Vassalli, Provedimenti urgenti per il processo civile [Urgent Measures
for Civil Process], reprinted in IL NuOvo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3,
at 33.
24. See ISTIrro NAZIONALE DI STATISTICA, STATISTICHE GUIDIZIARIE: ANNO 1989
[JUDICIAL STATISTICS: YEAR 1989] (1991). This is a 718-page compendium of data
concerning civil, criminal, and administrative proceedings in Italy. All of the information
concerns inflow and outcomes, with nothing reported on internal events within the cases.
For example, one can see the yearly volume of litigation flowing into the various trial and
appellate courts, the number of yearly dispositions, and the number of cases remaining on
the docket. These statistics are reported both in terms of gross numbers and by court of
appeal districts. Id. at 31 tbl. 1.1, 43-44 tbls. 2.1-2.3. The statistics present no data that de-
tails why backlogs are increasing at a particular level or in a particular district. For a
description of the statistical reporting forms used in the Italian courts, see CORRADO,
supra note 9, at 66-68. The Procuratore General of the Court of Cassation publishes, in
a weekly journal, an annual status report of the caseload in Cassation. See, e.g., Vittorio
Sgroi, Relazione Sull'Amministrazione della Giustizia [Report on Administration of Justice],
48 IL MONDO GIUDIZIARIO [THE JUDICIAL WORLD], Feb. 22, 1993, at pt. V.
25. The principal legislative documents are reprinted in DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra
note 21. This publication is unpaginated, and it contains the following written reports:
REPORT OF ATTORNEY-GENERAL GIULIANO VASSALLI, PROVEDIMENTI URGENTI PER
IL PROCESSO CIVILE [URGENT MEASURES FOR CIVIL PROCESS], Senate, 10th Legis. (Aug.
8, 1988) (reporting on Bill 1288) [hereinafter VASSALLI REPORT]; REPORT OF SENATORS
ACONE & LIPARI, SENATE SECOND PERMANENT COMMITTEE (JUSTICE), 10th Legis. (Jan.
11, 1989) (reporting on Bill 1288 as introduced by Government) [hereinafter ACONE-
LIPARI FIRST REPORT]; REPORT OF SENATORS ACONE & LIPARI, SENATE SECOND
PERMANENT COMMITTEE (JuSTICE), 10th Legis. (Aug. 1, 1989) (reporting on Bill 1288 as
amended by special subcommittee) [hereinafter ACONE-LIPARI SECOND REPORT]; REPORT
OF SENATORS ACONE & LIPARI, SENATE SECOND PERMANENT COMMITTEE (JUSTICE),
10th Legis. (Feb. 23, 1990) (reporting on Bill 1288 as approved by Senate Justice
Committee) [hereinafter ACONE-LIPARI THIRD REPORT]; REPORT OF VIRGINIO
ROGNONI, CHAIRMAN, HOUSE SECOND PERMANENT COMMITTEE (JUSTICE), 10th Legis.
(May 15, 1990) (reporting on Senate Bill, renumbered Bill 4638) [hereinafter ROGNONI
REPORT).
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total absence of statistical documentation regarding, for example,
caseloads per judge, disposition rates, disposition times by case
category, and the amount of time that cases remain on the docket.
Except for a few figures documenting delays in the trial courts'
and the Court of Cassation,' most information regarding Italian
civil delay consists of adjectives and anecdotes.29 Nevertheless,
the primary actors of the reform legislation have uniformly recog-
nized that cases tend to linger "eternally" on the Italian civil docket.'
In addition, DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA contains verbatim transcripts of the following
committee meetings: Senate Judiciary Committee meetings held Jan. 11, 1989, Jan. 18,
1989, Aug. 1, 1989, Nov. 15, 1989, Nov. 16, 1989, Nov. 22, 1989, Nov. 29, 1989, Dec. 13,
1989 (morning), Dec. 13, 1989 (afternoon), Dec. 14, 1989, Jan. 16, 1990, and Oct. 31, 1990;
House Judiciary Committee meetings held May 15, 1990, May 23, 1990, June 5, 1990, June
6, 1990, June 20, 1990, July 31, 1990, Sept. 26, 1990, Sept. 27, 1990, and Oct. 3, 1990.
DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA also reprints the 353d public session of the Italian Senate, Feb. 28,
1990 (afternoon). See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21. The Superior Council on
the Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) offered views on Bill 1288. See 8
FORO ITALIANO pt. V, cols. 245-49 (1989) [hereinafter CSM SECOND REPORT]. The
Council also commented on an earlier bill (Bill 2214-the "Rognoni Bill"). See
DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21 [hereinafter CSM FIRST REPORT].
26. For secondary works on the 1990 Amendments, see CLAUDIO CONSOLO ET AL.,
LA RIFORMA DEL PROCESSO CIVILE [REFORM OF CIVIL PROCESS] (1991); Andrea Proto
Pisani, La Nuova Disciplina del Processo Ordinario di Cognizione di Primo Grado e
d'Appello [The New Rules of Process for Ordinary Proceedings at the Trial and Appellate
Levels], in V FORO ITALIANO cols. 249-334 (1991); Giacomo Oberto, I1 Giudizio di Primo
Grado Dopo la Riforma del Processo Civile [Trial Court Proceedings After Civil Process
Reform], 4 Giur. It. cols. 313-27 (1991); FRANCESCO BARTOLINI, IL Nuovo PROCESSO
CIVILE [THE NEW CIVIL PROCESS] (La Tribuna-Accenza ed., 1993).
.27. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 62 (Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen.
Battello) (stating that the average case length exceeds eight years; average length at trial
is 1,136 days); id. at 67 (Sen. Filetti) (stating that there are 1,700,000 cases pending at the
trial level).
28. See id. at 21 (Dec. 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Covi) (describing a four-year delay
in Cassation); id. at 67 (Feb. 28, 1990) (describing a 42,000-case backlog in Cassation).
29. See, e.g., id. at 4 (May 23, 1990) (statement of Deputy Bargone) (stating that trial
judges have more than 100 cases scheduled for a single session); CSM FIRST REPORT,
supra note 25, at col. 422 (stating that judges have over 1,000 assigned cases). Workload,
by itself, does not determine case-processing time. See BARRY MAHONEY, NATIONAL
CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, CHANGING TIMES IN TRIAL COURTS 193 (1988) (three-year
study of case processing in eighteen urban trial courts).
30. See, e.g., ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 24 (noting the "frightful
backlog accumulating in judicial offices"); DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 2
(Jan. 18, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Filetti) (describing the Italian system as eternal delays of
biblical length); id. at 399 (remarks of Deputy Bargone) (describing how civil justice delay
is causing victims to turn to street justice offered by criminal enforcers).
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According to common opinion, the crisis of delay was caused
by a set of 1950 reforms31 that permitted lawyers to string out
cases by adding claims, issues, and proofs during the course of
litigation,32 and even on appeal.33
C. The Reform Process
Solutions to the civil justice problem began to emerge as early
as 1981, when noted scholars and legislators drafted reform
texts. The reform process accelerated in August 1988, when law
The case backlog was increasing steadily in Italy's primary trial courts:
1987 1988 1989
Preture 611,674 709,979 790,027
Tribunali 931,673 1,005,847 1,022,688
ISTITUTO NAZIONALE DI STATISTICA, supra note 24, at 32 tbl. 1.1.
From pending, filed, and terminated case data, one can calculate a median delay index
that indicates the amount of time the median case remains on a court's docket. See
CORRADO, supra note 9, at 72; Chase, supra note 1, at 45 (citing David S. Clark & John
H. Merryman, Measuring the Duration of Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 75
MICH. L. REV. 89, 92-93 (1976)). In 1980, a case tried in the tribunal, reviewed by the
court of appeals, and then decided by Cassation required 2,934 days, or eight years. See
CORRADO, supra note 9, at 72 tbl. 5 (tribunal-966 days; court of appeals-807 days;
Cassation-1,161 days). The Clark-Merryman duration formula can be applied to later
statistics to ascertain Italy's situation ten years later. See IsT1TUTO NAZIONALE DI
STATISTICA, supra note 24, at 32 tbl. 1.1. In 1990, a case that followed a full appeal cycle
would be litigated for 5,740 days, or 15.7 years, as follows: tribunal-,304 days; court of
appeals-1,339 days; Cassation-2,411 days. Id. This data supports the comments of the
Italian legislators regarding the civil justice crisis.
31. Law of July 14, 1950, No. 581, Gazz. Uff. No. 253, Oct. 28, 1940. See, e.g.,
DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 3-4 (Jan. 18, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Filetti)
(Grandi Code of 1940-42 despoiled by counter reform of 1950). Because of pressure from
the Italian bar, the 1950 law abolished mandatory time limits, leaving Italian trial judges
at the mercy of lawyer tactics. See Giovanni A. Micheli, Preliminary Instruction in Europe:
The Italian Experience, with some Comparative Data, in COURT CONGESTION 83, 88, 90,
104 (1971).
32. See, e.g., IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 126
(providing that parties can modify claims and defenses, produce new documents, and ask
for more proof hearings any time before remission to panel). In the old Civil Code, this
provision was contained in Article 184. See id.
33. See, e.g., IL Nuovo CODICE Dl PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 163
(providing that parties can introduce new defenses and new documents and ask for proof-
takings on appeal). In the old Civil Code, this provision was contained in Article 345(1).
See id.
34. For concise descriptions of the reform measures proposed in the decades preceding
approval of Law 353, see Introduzione alle "Riforme Urgenti" del Processo Civile [Intro-
duction to the "Urgent Reforms" of Civil Process] in DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note
21, at 5-9; ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 3-4; DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA,
supra note 21, at 8-9 (Jan. 18, 1989) (statements of Sen. Battello); CSM SECOND REPORT,
supra note 25, at cols. 393-95.
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professor and Attorney General Giulano Vassalli introduced and
explained Senate Bill 1288, 35 which carried the approval of the
Italian cabinet.3 6  This Bill was referred to the Senate Justice
Committee, which assigned two other law professors, Senators
Lipari and Acone, to draft a report on the Bill. 7 On January 11,
1989, the two professors rendered a detailed report to the Justice
Committee.8 The Committee's chairman then appointed a
special committee of twelve senators, and charged them with the
responsibility of studying and improving Bill 1288.39 This special
committee worked through the spring and summer of 1989 and
reported to the Senate's Justice Committee on August 1, 1989. 40
On November 15, 1989, the Justice Committee commenced a two-
month debate of each article and voted on Bill 1288 as revised by
the special committee.41 On February 23, 1990, Professors Acone
and Lipari submitted another report on Bill 1288, this time to the
Senate President.42 Five days later, the Senate approved Bill
1288.43
Between May and October of 1990, in nine reported sessions,
the Justice Committee of the House of Deputies worked on Bill
1288." On October 3, the House of Deputies unanimously
approved the Senate text with only minor modifications.45 These
House amendments, reverted to the Senate Justice Committee, and
35. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 8-32.
36. See Costituzione [COST.] art. 71(1) (Italy), which is the Council of Ministers ("The
Italian Constitution vests a power to introduce legislation in the 'Government."') See also
COST. art. 92(1).
37. See DOCUMENTi GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 2 (Jan. 11, 1989)(statement of
Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman, Senator Covi).
38. ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25.
39. DOCUMENTi GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 21 (Jan. 18, 1989).
40. ACONE-LIPARI SECOND REPORT, supra note 25. No record of the special
committee's deliberations exist. See Luigi Scotti, Presentazione [Preface], in DOCUMENTI
GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21.
41. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, meetings of Nov. 12, 1989, Nov. 22,
1989, Nov. 29, 1989, Dec. 13, 1989 (morning), Dec. 13, 1989 (afternoon), Dec. 14, 1989,
Jan. 16, 1990, Jan. 17, 1990.
42. ACONE-LIPARI THIRD REPORT, supra note 25.
43. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 75 (352d Public Meeting, Feb. 28,
1990).
44. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, meetings of May 15, 1990, May 23,
1990, June 5, 1990, June 6, 1990, June 20, 1990, July 31, 1990, Sept. 26, 1990, Sept. 27, 1990,
Oct. 3, 1990.
45. See id. at 10 (Oct. 3, 1990).
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voted into law on the last day of October, became known as Law
353.46
A bill restructuring the lowest level Italian courts, the
counciliators, complemented Law 353.47 One of the main civil
justice reforms of the bill was the downward transfer of simple,
repetitive, low value cases from the clogged tribunals to the pretori
and conciliatori.' The conciliatori had been in disarray, having
little work and low reputation.49 On November 21, 1991, Law
3740 revitalized this post.5"
D. Caveats
Before reviewing the 1990 Italian reforms, it is important to
note a fundamental procedural difference from the U.S. process,
which directly impacts on delay and cost. The Italian civil justice
system presumes that a plaintiff has proof "in hand" at the outset
of his suit. Only limited document discovery is permitted. 2
Because proof is generally "in hand," little should happen during
the processing of the case to change its essential nature. The focus
of the procedural reformer, then, is to induce the litigants to assert
their factual and legal propositions as early and as clearly as
possible. In this manner, delays caused by redefinition and
addition of issues may be avoided.
In contrast, the U.S. procedure presumes that parties who file
claims have some proof to justify the initiation of litigation,53 but
46. See id. at 48 (Oct. 31, 1990).
47. Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at
cols. 588-98 (1991).
48. See Andrea P. Pisani, L'istituzione del giudice di pace [The Institution of Justice of
the Peace], V FORO ITALIANO., supra note 26, at col. 582. The caseload of the conciliators
was steadily decreasing:
1987 91,820
1988 86,747
1989 81,102
IsTITuTo NAZIONALE DI STATISTICA, supra note 24, at 31 tbl. 1.1.
49. See id.
50. Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26.
51. See infra part II.E.1.
52. See C.P.c. art. 118 (allowing for inspection of persons and things by judge when
the inspection is indispensable to ascertain facts); id. art. 210 (allowing for an order to
exhibit indispensable documents and things); id. art. 94 (requiring specific identification
of the document or thing). See generally CAPPELLETrI & PERILLO, supra note 8, § 8.48
at 234-38.
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) ("after an inquiry reasonable under the circum-
stances... contentions.., are warranted by existing law... [and] have evidentiary sup-
868 [Vol. 16:861
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do not yet have access to mechanisms to gather other relevant
proofs. Discovery procedures offer this access. This initial lack of
proof creates an efficiency problem because, as parties unearth
facts through discovered documents and witnesses, new facts and
legal issues emerge and cause a constant redefinition of the law-
suit. Thus, issue management is considerably more difficult in the
United States than in Italy. Additionally, the complex discovery
rules in the United States create multiple controversies not found
in countries without discovery procedures. This difference in
procedure causes costs and delays that require different responses
for reform.
The difference in discovery rules favors Italy with regard to
cost and delay issues. Italy's fee structure for compensating attor-
neys, however, seems to cause unnecessary cost and delay. In
Italy, maximum charges are established by law for work actually
performed. Each step of the proceeding earns a specified fee for
the litigant's attorney, including a separate fee for each appearance
in court.54 This fee structure creates an economic incentive for
lawyers to complicate and prolong lawsuits." In contrast, U.S.
contingency fees encourage plaintiffs' lawyers to settle before
investing unnecessary time and resources in litigation. 6
Similarly, procedures used for tactical delay or expense vary
among the U.S. and Italian legal systems simply because of a
difference in rules. For example, while the Italian legal system is
plagued by jurisdictional appeals because the system is conducive
to misuse by tactical delay, 7 the U.S. prohibition of interlocutory
appeals58 eliminates this particular problem.
port.
54. See CAPPELLETrI & PERILLO, supra note 8, at 62.
55. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 46 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statements of
Assistant Attorney General Coco).
56. See Kevin M. Clermont & John D. Currivan, Improving on the Contingent Fee, 63
CORNELL L. REV. 529, 536 (1978); Murray L. Schwartz & Daniel J.B. Mitchell, An
Economic Analysis of the Contingent Fee in Personal-Injury Litigation, 22 STAN. L. REV.
1125, 1135-36 (1970).
57. See, e.g., DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 6-7 (Jan. 18, 1989) (statements
of Sen. Filetti).
58. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1990) (stating that only "final decisions" of district
courts are appealable).
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In sum, although the two legal systems face the same delay
and cost problems, the differences in procedure mandate different
responses for reform.59
E. The Main Italian Reforms
1. Passing the Buck
Due to massive existing caseloads, Italian procedural scholars
doubted that a streamlined trial process would significantly unclog
the tribunals.' Consequently, attention quickly focused on
transferring entire categories of cases to inferior trial levels.
61
The Italian trial courts are differentiated by the type of case
and the amount in controversy. The conciliators, now called
justices of the peace, have jurisdiction to adjudicate small claims
of 5,000,000 lire or less (approximately $3,125) and cases involving
automobile and boating incidents of up to 30,000,000 lire (approxi-
mately $18,750).62 Justices of the peace also have jurisdiction
over small land use, nuisance, and condominium maintenance
disputes.63 In 1991, the Italian legislature increased this juris-
diction from a meager 1,000,000 lire threshold (about $690), which
provided little caseload relief for the other trial courts.' Parlia-
ment sought to dignify this lowest level by changing the
magistrates' title from "conciliator" to "justice of the peace."'65
The 4,700 justices of the peace' became known as law gradu-
ates;67 these officials were in the last phase of their careers,
59. This Article focuses on the style of legal reform and, therefore, considers only the
procedural response to cost and delay in the civil justice system, and not the budgetary
scope of the problem. In both countries, lack of sufficient courts, personnel, and
machinery is a constant source of judicial crisis. See, e.g., J. Michael McWilliams,
Dwindling Judicial Resources, 79 A.B.A. J. 8 (July 1993); DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra
note 21, at 68 (Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Filetti).
60. See, e.g., Pisani, supra note 48, col. 581.
61. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
62. C.P.c. art. 7, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 17, reprinted in V
FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at cols. 588-98.
63. Id.
64. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 86 (former art.
7).
65. Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, arts. 1, 17, 45, reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO,
supra note 26, at cols. 588, 591, 597.
66. Id. art. 3, reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 588.
67. Id. art. 5(1)(g), reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 589.
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primarily between the ages of fifty and seventy five years old.6
Justices of the peace earn up to $750 per month for criminal hear-
ings, up to $375 monthly for civil hearings, and $35 per civil
judgment or successful conciliation69-not enough compensation
to detract from the "honorary" nature of the post.7' The justice
of the peace cases follow a simplified process, allowing a maximum
of two hearings, and emphasize conciliation and quick decisions.7
Parties may represent themselves in cases involving no more than
1,000,000 lire (about $690) and, with the justice's permission, in
other cases.72 In small cases involving 2,000,000 lire (about
$1380) or less, the justice decides on grounds of "equity. '73  In
larger disputes, the parties can agree to an "equity" ruling.74 In
both situations, the equity decision is unappealable.75
The downward shift of caseload responsibility characterizes
the Italian Government's effort to decongest the main trial courts,
or tribunals. Rather than augmenting the number of career
judgeships at the main trial level, the government increased the
responsibilities of auxiliary staff, such as justices of the peace.76
Presumably, the modest daily and per-case stipends would decrease
the public cost of providing justices at this level.
Similarly, the maximum jurisdiction of a higher level trial
judge, or pretore, has quadrupled from five million to twenty
million lire (about $12,500).n The introduction of the "oral argu-
ment-oral decision method" further streamlined the trial proce-
68. Id. art. 5(1)(e), reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 589.
69. Id. arts. 11(1), 11(2), reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 590.
70. Id. art. 11(1), reprinted in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 590 ("The
position of justice of the peace is honorary.").
71. C.P.c. art. 320, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 29, reprinted in
V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 594.
72. C.P.c. art. 82, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 20, reprinted in
V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 593.
73. C.t'.c. art. 113(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 21, reprinted
in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 593.
74. C.P.c. art. 114.
75. C.P.c. art. 339(3), as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 33, reprinted
in V FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 595.
76. Some scholars doubt that Italian law schools are generating enough qualified stu-
dents to significantly increase the bench in a responsible fashion. See, e.g., Pisani, supra
note 48, at cols. 581-82. In Italy, a judgeship is a career position that commences with the
successful completion of a difficult, competitive examination. See Joseph M. Perillo, The
Legal Professions of Italy, 18 J. LEGAL EDuC. 274, 290 (1966).
77. C.P.C. art. 8, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 18, reprinted in V
FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 592.
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dure at this level.7" This concept involves the rendering of an
immediate decision, with a brief verbal rationale, immediately
following oral argument.79  "The oral argument-oral decision
method" was recommended by the Superior Council of the
Judiciary (Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura) as a means to
circumvent the "judgment-writing bottleneck," a main cause of
delay in the justice system80 Consequently, each pretore now has
the option of either taking the slower briefing and judgment-writ-
ing route81 or using the quicker oral argument-oral decision
method. Thus, the pretore now has a "fast route" for resolving the
simpler cases.
As a result of the amendments made by Law 374/1991,
enacted a year after Law 353/1990, the Italian tribunal is now
reserved for -cases involving damages exceeding twenty million
lire.
2. "Put Up or Shut Up"
Italian civil lawsuits are perceived as endless sagas character-
ized by suspensions, extensions, and constant additions of new
issues and proofs. Sufficient accounts of endless litigation exist83
to justify reforms directed at limiting the life span of a lawsuit.
Still, empirical evidence analyzing delay based on the type of
lawsuit, delay- caused by the courts, and the circumstances
surrounding delay would help to analyze the problem. The Italian
Government does not generate data to facilitate such specific
understanding.' Thus, the Italian reformers isolated the in-
stances and causes of delay based on personal experience, second-
hand reports, and logic. The reformers concluded that the source
78. C.P.c. art. 315, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 39, Gazz. Uff
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 156.
79. Id.
80. See CSM FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at cols. 408-09.
81. C.P.c. art. 314, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 38(2), Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 156.
82. C.P.C. art. 8, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 18, reprinted in V
FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 592.
83. See, e.g., CAPPELLETTI ET AL., supra note 8, at app. B (translated transcript of a
simple tort case with almost 50 hearings).
84. C.P.C. art. 8, as amended by Law of Nov. 21, 1991, No. 374, art. 18, reprinted in V
FORO ITALIANO, supra note 26, at col. 592.
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of these delays was a liberal 1950 reform that enabled lawyers to
extend the life of a lawsuit by adding new issues and proofs
throughout the "instruction" stage.' Moreover, Italian trial
judges' inability to sanction a party who ignored deadlines exacer-
bated the delay.86
To compress lawsuits, the Italian reformers adopted a "put up
or shut up" tactic under which code provisions imposed action
deadlines and duties upon parties, while waivers of claims and
defenses served as sanctions to stimulate action. For example, the
Italian defendant must include all counterclaims, affirmative
defenses, and technical exceptions in a timely-filed answer to the
complaint (comparsa di risposta), or these claims and defenses are
automatically waived.' In the summons-complaint (citazione),
the plaintiff sets a date for the first organizational hearing (udienza
di trattazione) and warns the defendant that a failure to file his
answer at least twenty days before the first hearing will result in
a loss of counterclaims and special defenses.' The only new
claims and exceptions permitted at the initial hearing are those
made by the plaintiff in response to the defendant's counter-
claims.8 9 Claims and exceptions in the complaint may only be
"made more precise" and "modified" with the judge's permis-
sion.' Similarly, the defendant, must name third parties in his
answer to the complaint and summon them or waive the right to
do so.91 Plaintiffs are also at risk of loss because they must ask
85. See Law of July 14, 1950, No. 581, Gazz. Uff. No. 253, Oct. 28, 1940. See, e.g.,
DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 3-4 (Jan.'18, 1989) (remarks of Sen. Filetti)
(Grandi Code of 1940-42 despoiled by counter reform of 1950). Because of pressure from
the Italian bar, the 1950 law abolished mandatory time limits, leaving Italian trial judges
at the mercy of lawyer tactics. See Micheli, supra note 31, at 83, 88, 90, 104.
86. See, e.g., C.P.C. art. 152(1) ("The deadlines for the completion of procedural acts
are established by statute; only if a statute so provides may a judge extinguish a claim or
defense for failure to comply with deadlines the judge sets.").
87. C.P.c. arts. 167(2), 171(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, arts. 11,
13, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA
CIVILE, supra note 3, at 120, 122.
88. C.P.c. art. 163(7), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 7, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NUoVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 118.
89. C.P.C. art. 183(4), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 17, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 126.
90. Id.
91. C.P.C. arts. 167(3), 269(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, arts. 11,
29, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NUOVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA
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the trial judge's permission to bring in third party defendants
against counterclaims no later than the first hearing.' This is in
contrast to the 1950-1992 regime, when lawyers could rewrite
claims and defenses and add third-parties almost at will.'
Senator Acone described these action-forcing measures as a re-
quirement for parties to "empty their sack" by the end of the first
hearing.94
Similarly, a defendant must promptly challenge the court's
subject matter jurisdiction and venue, or these challenges are
waived. Neither the parties nor the court itself may raise such
challenges after the first hearing.95 Prior to the 1990 reform, the
trial judge could raise any of these objections at any time, and the
parties could raise the lack of subject matter jurisdiction at any
time.96  The defendant, however, had to challenge venue at his
first opportunity.'
3. The Judge-Manager
The Italian reformers adopted the "managerial judge"
approach. Although this approach is now popular in the United
States,98 the legislative record is barren of references to the U.S.
experience. A quote from Senator Lipari, one of the chief
reformers, catches the purpose and essence of the new judicial
duty:
CIVILE, supra note 3, at 120, 144.
92. C.P.C. art. 269(3), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 29, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 144.
93. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 126 (former arts.
183-184).
94. DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 15 (Feb. 28, 1990).
95. C.P.C. art. 38(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 4, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 93.
96. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 93 (former art.
38(1)).
97. See id. at 93 (formerly art. 38).
98. See, e.g., Francis E. McGovern, Toward a Functional Approach for Managing
Complex Litigation, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 440 (1986); Paul R. J. Connolly, Why We Do Need
Managerial Judges, 23 JUDGES' J. 34 (1984); Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 374 (1982); Robert F. Peckham, The Federal Judge as a Case Manager: The New
Role in Guiding a Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770 (1981); Alvin B.
Rubin, The Managed Calendar: Some Pragmatic Suggestions About Achieving the Just,
Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Civil Cases in Federal Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 135
(1978).
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As to preparation (trattazione) of the case, in every procedural
order which is structured on the basis of the principles of oral-
ity, concentration and immediacy, the preparatory hearing plays
a fundamental role ... during which the judge must from the
start eliminate from the discussion the superfluous and the futile
and, assuming he does not succeed in leading the parties to
conciliation on all points, reduce the controversy to those few
essential questions which have a true need to be decided.99
The reformers doubled the time between service of the
complaint upon the defendant and the date of the first hearing to
a minimum of sixty days,1°° with the defendant's answer due on
the fortieth day (twenty days before the hearing). 101 The under-
lying purpose is to streamline a case and encourage more efficient
litigation by requiring each party to invest time initially to narrow
and refine issues."0 2 Thus, the defendant has at least forty days
to frame a careful response to the complaint, the plaintiff has
twenty days to respond to the answer at the first hearing, and the
"instructing" judge, who gets the pleadings promptly upon his ap-
pointment,10 3 can adequately prepare for his managerial functions
at the first hearing. These duties include questioning the parties,
attempting a settlement, and narrowing and clarifying the is-
sues. 4  Refined pleadings are to be filed no later than thirty
99. ACONE-LIPARi FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 10. The management approach
stems from a realization that civil justice is a "public function" and rejects the "common
mistaken philosophy" that civil courts serve only private interests. CSM FIRST REPORT,
supra note 25, at cols. 401-02.
100. C.P.c. art. 163(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 8, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 118.
101. C.P.c. art. 166, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 10, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 120.
102. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 33 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statement of Sen.
Acone). This approach is consistent with U.S. empirical research:
The point at which a court begins to become involved in monitoring the progress
of litigation and in scheduling future events is important. Faster courts take
cognizance of cases at the commencement of a lawsuit, and have mechanisms to
enable periodic monitoring and early setting of schedules for future events.
MAHONEY, supra note 29, at 194.
103. See C.P.c. art. 168(3), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 12, Gazz.
Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra
note 3, at 121.
104. See C.P.C. art. 183, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 17, Gazz.
Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE Di PROCEDURA, supra note 3,
at 125-26.
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days from the first hearing,"5 and the amended pleadings control
the shape of the lawsuit thereafter."°6 This clear delineation of
the issues will, according to the reformers, enable the judge to
exercise his managerial powers wisely.0 7
.Yet, Italian legislators may have legislated in vain, due to a
lack of specific information about the dynamics of litigating a civil
case in their trial courts. The large caseloads facing the Italian
trial bench,0 8 combined with inadequate support personnel,'"
may prevent the individualized case management contemplated by
the reform. The attempt at conciliation may be as pro forma as al-
ways,"0 and the attorneys may soon ignore their duty to come to
the first hearing with a thorough knowledge of the facts."' The
use of pleading techniques that focus on subtleties, such as
permitted "modifications"-as compared to prohibited "addi-
tions"-may generate new, costly, and time-consuming areas of
controversy, especially in view of the potential loss of claim or
defense." 2 The legislators lacked data that would enable them
to predict how Italian judges will exercise their power to excuse a
105. C.P.c. art. 183(5), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 17, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 126.
106. C.P.c. art. 189, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 23, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NUOVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 128 (proposed findings by parties must stay within the limits set by pleadings).
107. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
108. See, e.g., ISTITUTO NAZIONALE DI STATISTICA, supra note 24, at 31 tbl. 1.1 (at end
of 1989, 1,022,688 cases pending in tribunals); Oberto, supra note 26, at cols. 317-19
(expressing doubts about the efficacy of new management duties).
109. See Chase, supra note 1, at 54; PIERO PAJARDI, PER QUESTI MOTIVI ... VITA E
PASSIONE DI UN GIUDICE [FOR THESE REASONS... LIFE AND PASSIONS OF A JUDGE]
33, 72 (1986); Perillo, supra note 76, at 294 (stating that "[judicial law clerks are
inexistent").
110. See PAJARDI, supra note 109, at 15 (E.g., when the question "Will you settle?" is
the only effort at conciliation by the parties); Micheli, supra note 31, at 86-87 (describing
conciliation provisions as being in "total oblivion" and "obsolete"). Data support these
conclusions. In 1989, only 3,817 cases out of 295,674 dispositions ended by conciliations
in the tribunali. See ISTITruTO NAZIONALE DI STATISTICA, supra note 24, at 31 tbl. 1.1,
32 tbl. 1.3.
111. C.P.C. art. 183(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 17, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 125-26 (inference of contrary proof may be drawn from a lawyer's failure to know
facts at a first hearing).
112. See CONSOLO ET AL., supra note 26, at 92 (distinguishing "material" versus "sec-
ondary" facts); Oberto, supra note 26, col. 315 (analyzing valid and invalid pleading
amendments).
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party's pleading, appearance, and proof errors,1 13 or how they
will exercise their power to permit pleading modifications. A
lengthy regime of party control 1 4 may not readily be supplanted
by tough managerial judging. This is particularly true, given that
the legislature constantly waffled between the right to be heard
and the right to a speedy, efficient trial." This ambivalence is
characterized by the concept of a "non-authoritarian" manager-
judge.
116
The Italian appellate system, like many civil law regimes,"'
permitted attorneys to raise new arguments freely, and even to
present new proofs on appeal.' If this tradition were to contin-
ue, the effort to promote dignity, finality, and efficiency in the trial
courts would be contradicted. Consequently, Law 353 limited new
proofs on appeal to those that the appellate panel found "indis-
pensable" to a just result, or when such proofs could not have
been offered for reasons not attributable to the offering party.'19
4. Divide and Conquer
Based on the theory that three minds are better than one,
1 20
Italy, like other civil law countries, normally provided for a three-
judge trial court."' One of the three judges was designated
"instructing" judge" 2 and was responsible for refining the issues
and taking proofs."2  When this "packaging" phase was com-
113. C.P.C. art. 184(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26,1990, No. 353, art. 19, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 127.
114. See Micheli, supra note 31, at 105 (stating that "the litigation followed the pace
given to it by the attorneys"); Perillo, supra note 76, at 295 (asserting that lawyers resent
bureaucratic interference by judges).
115. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
116. Id. (stating that a judge is a non-authoritarian collaborator).
117. See INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW §§ 8-50 (1982).
118. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 163 (former art.
345(2)). Parties could propose new exceptions, produce new documents, and ask for new
proof-takings. Id.
119. C.P.c. art. 345(3), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 52, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 163.
120. See PIERO PAJARDI, ESSERE GIUDICE OGGI [To BE A JUDGE TODAY] 182 (1990).
121. See C.P.c. art. 48, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra
note 3, at 411-12.
122. C.P.C. art. 168(1).
123. C.P.c. art. 174.
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plete, the instructing judge remitted the case file to the full
panel. 24 The parties had the right to oral argument to supple-
ment their briefs."25 At the hearing, the instructing judge related
the issues, facts, and relevant law to his or her colleagues 26 and
voted first.
127
In the 1992 Italian reform, the Italian legislature hotly debated
the question of converting to a unicameral bench."2  Many
believed, without empirical proof, that the three-judge panel
system was ineffective because the panel invariably followed the
lead of the instructing judge who had worked on the case for
months. 29  Others believed that the input of three colleagues
produced more sound results, particularly on points of law, appli-
cations of fact to law, and factual inferences. 130  While establish-
ment of a monocratic bench had been proposed in earlier bills, the
government declined to tackle this major issue in its proposal for
reform-Bill 1288."' The Senate Judiciary Committee opted for
the single-judge system in light of the "enormous number of civil
cases currently pending before the trial courts,' ' 2 reserving
three-judge courts for civil cases of special complexity.133  Single
judges would try the vast bulk of civil cases, including petitions to
execute judgments.34 This change also eliminated a frequent
124. C.P.c. art. 189, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 23, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NuovO CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 129.
125. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 146 (former art.
275(2)). After the 1992 reform, argument before single judges or the panel convened for
special cases became an option at the parties' discretion. See C.P.C. art. 190(2), as
amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 25, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990,
reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 130 (oral
argument before a single judge); C.P.C. art. 275(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 26 1992,
No. 353, art. 32, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI
PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 146 (oral argument before panel).
126. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 146 (former art.
275(1)).
127. C.P.c. art. 276(3).
128. See, e.g., ROGNONI REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
129. CONSOLO ET AL., supra note 26, at 577.
130. See, e.g., VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
131. Id. at 3.
132. ACONE-LIPARI THIRD REPORT, supra note 25, at 7-8. The Italian judicial leader-
ship strongly advocated the monocratic trial bench. See CSM FIRST REPORT, supra note
25, at cols. 397-99; CSM SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at cols. 248-49.
133. C.P.C. art. 48(2), reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra
note 3, at 411-12 (listing nine types of cases to be heard by three-judge panels).
134. Id. art. 48(4).
[Vol. 16:861
Civil Procedure Reform
cause of cost and delay-interlocutory appeals of the instructing
judge's proof rulings. For post-reform three-judge cases, parties
are precluded from appealing proof rulings until the entire case is
remitted to the panel.135
5. Cracking the Whip
The 1990 reform imposes a series of deadlines on trial judges
at points during the process at which judges were reputed to be re-
sponsible for delay. For example, a judge must render judgment
within sixty days of the deposit of the last brief.136 Additionally,
the trial judge cannot "buy time" on a busy calendar by scheduling
hearings farther and farther into the future. The 1990 Amend-
ments prohibit a judge from postponing the first hearing for more
than 45 days.137 No similar controls exist, however, on setting
dates for proof-taking sessions.131 Thus, cases may continue to
stretch out for years as Italian judges strive to cope with growing
caseloads. Imposing deadlines on busy judges may be unproduc-
tive because no sanctions accompany the violation of these
deadlines. 139 These deadlines may also create unrealistic expec-
tations for parties and increase criticism of the Italian bench.
6. The Games Are Over
The Amendments also try to preclude some notorious delay
tactics practiced by the Italian bar. For example, the old Code
permitted attorneys to challenge the trial court's subject matter
jurisdiction by raising objections, however frivolous, in the Court
135. Compare IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 124 (former
art. 178(2)) with C.P.c. art. 178(2), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 15,
Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE,
supra note 3, at 124.
136. C.P.c. art. 190(1), as added by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 25, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 129; C.P.c. art. 275(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 32, Gazz.
Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra
note 3, at 146.
137. C.P.c. art. 168(5), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 12, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 121.
138. See C.P.c. arts. 183(5), 184, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, arts. 17,
18, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVI-
LE, supra note 3, at 126.
139. See sources cited in supra notes 133-34.
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of Cassation."4 These special appeals automatically suspended
the trial pending final action by Cassation"-a lengthy delay
given the huge workload of the court.142 Law No. 353 changed
the Code by permitting the trial judge to refuse to suspend
proceedings at that level while considering whether the jurisdic-
tional challenge is "manifestly unfounded. 14 3 Similarly, motions
to reconsider, which are infrequently granted, no longer suspend
proceedings or execution of judgments."
A distinct but comparable change is that a defendant with a
clear, uncontested obligation to pay a portion of a plaintiff's claim
can no longer delay payment of his admitted obligation simply
because the plaintiff is requesting other sums that are contested.
Now, the plaintiff can receive a partial judgment for the uncontest-
ed amount, which is immediately executable. 45
Another abusive tactic favored by Italian lawyers was the
filing of frivolous appeals simply to defer execution of a meritori-
ous judgment. This delay was possible because appeals suspended
the execution of the judgment,1" with minor exceptions,147 and
the judgment-debtor could thus postpone payment of a legitimate
debt while the appeals ran their course. The reformers countered
this practice by making judgments executable unless an appellate
judge suspends the execution for "sufficient reason."1  This
140. C.P.c. art. 41(1).
141. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PRODECURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 170 (former art.
367(1)).
142. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 42 (Jan. 11, 1989) (remarks of Sen.
Acone) (stating that there were over 10,000 judgments appealed to Cassation in 1989); id.
at 3 (Jan. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Filetti) (describing the 33,000 case backlog in Court
of Cassation).
143. C.P.c. art. 367(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 61, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 170.
144. See C.P.c. art. 391(4), as added by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 67, Gazz.
Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NUOvO CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra
note 3, at 176; C.P.C. art. 398(4), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 68,
Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL NUOVO CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE,
supra note 3, at 178.
145. C.P.c. art. 186, as added by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 20, Gazz. Uff. No.
281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CiVILE, supra note 3,
at 127.
146. See IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 148 (former art.
282(1)).
147. See id. (former art. 282(2)).
148. See C.P.C. arts. 282, 283, 337, 351, as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353,
arts. 33, 34, 49, 56, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI
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reform may backfire, however, if appeals continue to be taken as
a matter of course, with the execution issue-itself subject to ap-
peals-adding more cost and delay to the process. The reformers
also doubled the legal rate of interest from five percent to ten
percent as a general deterrent against delays based on the
economics of income earned on capital.
149
The most notorious delay tactic in Italy prior to the reform
was the "no show"-failing to appear as required by a judge's
scheduling order or by the rules. The 1990 reformers have taken
a hard line on this practice, although not as hard as in the United
States."5 ° Prior to the reform, if both parties failed to appear at
the first hearing, a second hearing was automatically sched-
uled.' Then, the case is immediately removed from the dock-
et.'52 The matter may, however, be refiled before the same
judge within one year of such removal.'53
F The Italian Style of Reform
The Italian procedural reform of 1990 was a technical product
created by lawyer-legislators under the guidance of their law
professor colleagues.' 4 The essential manner of reform was to
hypothesize about the cause of the delay under the current code
of procedure and to make the changes dictated by logic and intu-
ition."'55 The subject of civil process was perceived as a "scientif-
PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 148, 161, 165.
149. CODICE CIVILE [C.c.] art. 1284 (Italy), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No.
353, art. 1, Gazz. Uff. No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI
PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 45.
150. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (dismissal for failure to comply with court order;
"on merits" if judge desires); see also id. at 55 (judgment against a party that fails to
defend).
151. See IL Nuovo CODICE Di PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note 3, at 125 (former art.
181(1)).
152. C.P.c. art. 181(1), as amended by Law of Nov. 26, 1990, No. 353, art. 16, Gazz. Uff.
No. 281, Dec. 1, 1990, reprinted in IL Nuovo CODICE DI PROCEDURA CIVILE, supra note
3, at 125.
153. C.P.c. art. 307(1).
154. These professors included Acone and Lipari. See ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT,
supra note 25; ACONE-LIPARI SECOND REPORT, supra note 25. ACONE-LiPARI THIRD
REPORT, supra note 25.
155. See, e.g., DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 37-38 (Jan. 11, 1989) (remarks
of Sen. Macis) ("doctrinal and scientific reasoning... juridical science"); id. at 58-59 (Feb.
28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Casoli) (learned "procedural science" at feet of the master,
Professor Piero Calamandrei).
19941 881
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L.J.
ic" matter,156 relatively free of "political" viewpoints.'57  Thus,
even when a legislator announced his political party's views, the
issues and solutions he introduced were typically free of polemics
and demagogy. A Communist or Republican lawyer-legislator
would speak in the style of a proceduralist, rather than a prose-
lytizer.
158
The primary creators of the 1990 reform were the twelve
Senators on the special committee,159 led by law professors
Acone and Lipari, who were the Justice Committee's reporters
(relatori). Assistant Attorney General Coco, a career magistrate,
presented the Government's views on each Senate and House
change everyday.' 6
The Government's reform draft, Bill No. 1288, was introduced
by law professor and then-Attorney General Giuliano Vassalli on
August 8, 1988.161 This proposal was modest in scope; the
government was unprepared to propose a monocratic trial
bench,162 for example, or a significant expansion of the jurisdic-
tion of the pretori or the conciliators. 163 Subsequent months
witnessed a substantial expansion of the reform, however, initiated
mostly by the Senate subcommittee."6  The reform, which be-
came quite revolutionary, was conceived by all as a "technical,"
"limited" intervention, rushed along for more than eight years to
cope with an exigent crisis. 6 In the future, a systematic codifi-
cation of procedural structures and principles that followed more
"scientific" approaches would be required. Many lawyer-legisla-
tors, steeped in the code tradition, were uncomfortable with
156. Id.
157. See id. at 29 (Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Sen. Lipari).
158. See id. at 38-39 (statement of Sen. Macis) (stating the position of the Communist
Group).
159. See id. at 21.
160. See id. at 45.
161. For a copy of the government proposal, see VASSALL1 REPORT, supra note 25, at
8-31. For a discussion of earlier proposals, see ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note
25, at 3-4, 8.
162. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 3-4; ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra
note 25, at 38.
163. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
164. See DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 23 (Jan. 17, 1990) (statement of At-
torney General Vassalli).
165. Id. at 8 (Jan. 18, 1989) (statement of Sen. Battello) (a "tiny" reform nevertheless
of "great importance").
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piecemeal amendments and preferred some grand, interrelated de-
sign.' 66
The reformers relied primarily on logic, intuition, and personal
experience. The debates, as well as secondary literature, are
remarkably void of quantitative data about the functioning of the
civil justice system. The legislature knew that the problem it
needed to address 6 7 was a general stultification and "paraly-
sis" '68 of the civil justice process. Although legislators made
statements capable of empirical validation at various levels of the
process, they failed to provide statistical support. For example,
Attorney General Vassalli dogmatically asserted that the three-
judge panel does not cause delay,169 a proposition that is dubious
on its face and begs verification. The reformers believed that
jurisdictional appeals, which suspend the trial, would invite and
cause abuse by delay-seeking debtors. 170  Not a single fact is
offered in support of this suspicion. A further example of
unverified statements about the "reality" of the Italian civil justice
system is Senator Lipari's assertion, in his prepared remarks on the
Vassalli bill, that interlocutory appeals to the three-judge panel of
the instructing judge's proof rulings were infrequently utilized and,
thus, could safely be eliminated.71 Yet, Senator Lipari could not
know the incidence of such interlocutory appeals, because the
Italian system does not gather information on internal events in
civil litigation. Other legislators complained of judges' practice of
delaying hearings and rulings for years; their complaints also
lacked support.
The lack of data regarding the functioning of the Italian court
system also forced reformers to presume that the same problems
existed to the same degree in all Italian courtrooms. For example,
166. See, e.g., id. at 27 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statement of Sen. Lipari) (stating that reform by
means of a systematic code is preferable); id. at 18 (Feb. 28, 1990) (statement of Attorney
General Vassalli); ACONE-LIPARI SECOND REPORT, supra note 25, at 5 (stating that partial
reform is not an "alibi" for avoiding global reform).
167. See, e.g., DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 3 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statement of
Committee Chairperson Covi).
168. See, e.g., ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 3 (citing actual paralysis
of civil process).
169. See VASSALLI REPORT, supra note 25, at 3.
170. See, e.g., id. at 2.
171. See ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 10.
172. See, e.g., DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 43 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Correnti).
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when Senator Lipari spoke of lawyers and judges using "creases in
procedure" to slow down a case and the lack of strong ethics in
the bar to combat tactical delay,173 he spoke necessarily of all of
Italy-from the courtrooms of Trieste in the north, to those of
Palermo, a thousand miles to the south and totally dissimilar in
history, culture, and tradition. Empirical studies in the United
States demonstrate that the "local legal culture" strongly influences
courtroom behavior and judges' tolerance.174 Thus, the premise
that lawyers behave similarly across a vast territory is suspect and
may produce dysfunctional reforms.
The Italians occasionally lamented the absence of modern,
computer-based data-gathering mechanisms. Senator Lipari noted
that Italy lacked "culture and sensibility" favoring computeriza-
tion. 7  Thus, lawyers were forced to search court records page
by page for information that was easily retrievable from a
computer database.
176
Architects of the Italian legal reform compensated for the lack
of empiricism with their experience and expertise. Legislative
debates and reports, as well as outside contributions, reflected an
academic style, including several Latinisms common to Italian legal
literature and lecture. 77 All contributors to the debate operated
from a position of technical comfort. The debates reflect a
mastery of the legal code that has been inculcated in the law
schools and honed in the courts. Although individual lawyer-
legislators might profess deference to the reporter-professors,1
78
each possessed intimate knowledge of the procedural code, person-
al or second-hand experiences in its malfunctioning, and a wealth
of ideas for improvement. The reform became more detailed and
expansive through the exchange of ideas.179  Although it is
impossible to trace the inspiration of each of the ninety-two
articles ultimately comprising Law 353, it appears that many scho-
173. See ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 26.
174. Thomas Church, Jr., et al., Justice Delayed: The Pace of Litigation in Urban Trial
Courts, 2 ST. CT. J. 4 (1978).
175. See ACONE-LIPARI FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at 26.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 29 (statement of Sen. Lipari) ("extreme technicality of the discourse").
178. DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 45 (Jan. 11, 1989) (statement of Sen. Co-
co) (stating that the Acone-Lipari Report was the source of his "inferiority complex").
179. The groups contributing to the reform process included the Italian Association of
Students of Civil Process, Democratic Judiciary, Superior Council of the Judiciary, Group
of Independent Left, and the Communist Party. Id. at 3, 30.
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lars and groups, including the bench, contributed significantly to
the final product. While legal technicians, particularly the
university scholars, dominated the process,'80 legal experts from
all branches of the profession collaborated their efforts to reform
Italian procedure. Legislators constantly mentioned and ultimately
adopted the ideas and proposals of the Superior Council of the
Judiciary. The Senate Judiciary Committee regularly consulted
judges as it reworked the Vassalli draft. 81 The Italian Parlia-
ment, recognizing that an excluded, hostile bench and bar could
subvert any reform, invited widespread input from the entire legal
community.'82
Although the Italian reformers lacked knowledge about the
operational impact of the rules of procedure, they clearly demon-
strated their textual mastery. The legislative discussions reflect an
extraordinary command of the history and content of the various
articles of procedure under review, along with relevant doctrine
and jurisprudence. Furthermore, reporters Acone and Lipari were
fully cognizant of the details of a dozen or so different reform
proposals. The conversations of the legislators resembled a round-
table drafting session, with each proposal, phrase, and word the
subject of microscopic attention.
III. UNITED STATES CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM: BUILDING FROM
THE "BOTTOM UP'
'183
A. The Empirical Framework
Legal realism prevalent in the United States constantly calls
for empirical studies of the behavior of courts."u If law is no
180. Law Professors Acone, Lipari, and Vassalli dominated the process directly; in addi-
tion, references to ideas of other procedural scholars were frequently interjected into the
debates. See, e.g., DOCUMENTI GIUSTIZIA, supra note 21, at 8 (Dec. 13, 1989) (statement
of Sen. Covi) (discussing the ideas of the proceduralist Professor Tarzia).
181. See id. at 22 (Dec. 13, 1989) (statement of Sen. Lipari) (citing conversations with
judges of Court of Cassation).
182. See id. at 96 (Jan. 18, 1989) (statement of Committee Chairperson Covi).
183. S. REP. No. 416, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6802, 6806.
184. See Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Co-
LUM. L. REv. 809, 829-34 (1935) (calling for redirection of research); Maurice Rosenberg,
The Impact of Procedure-Impact Studies in the Administration of Justice, 51 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 30 (1988) (calling for empirical research on a "vast range of...
significant subjects").
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more than "what the courts ... do in fact,"' '  then the law
student must have ample information about court operations and
rulings. Thus, the U.S. judicial system increasingly utilizes a well-
developed and organized system of data gathering.1" Both prac-
titioners and academics have embraced the techniques of social
scientists in pursuit of legal truth. 87 Indeed, lawyers are inclined
to emulate social scientists more often than philosophers, particu-
larly in operational areas like civil procedure,"u and interdisci-
plinary teams are commonly assembled for empirical projects. 89
This emphasis on empiricism results in constant scrutiny of the
operations of U.S. courts. The Administrative Office of the
United States Courts periodically monitors federal courts,19°
while the National Center for State Courts publishes an annual re-
port on the state courts."H In addition, The Institute for Civil
Justice of the Rand Corporation,"9 The Federal Judicial Cen-
185. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
186. A bibliography published in 1988 listed 316 empirical studies in U.S. civil
procedure. See Michael Chiorazzi, Empirical Studies in Civil Procedure: A Selected Anno-
tated Bibliography, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS' 87 (1988).
187. But see Rosenberg, supra note 184, at 13.
Many lawyers and judges appear to believe that thinking like a lawyer means
relying on law books, logic, speculation, argument and-when it comes to
addressing questions of soci[etal] reality-invoking intuition .... Lawyers are
suspicious or fearful or both when they confront the methods and findings of the
social sciences.
The many research projects he himself describes, and their visible impacts, underline Pro-
fessor Rosenberg's pessimism. See id. at 17-27. As the dean of U.S. procedural research,
Professor Rosenberg continues to trumpet the call.
188. The acquisition and use of social science skills by the academic lawyer is exempli-
fied by Professor Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin. See ASSOCIATION OF
AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS, DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 1992-93, at 390 (1992). For
the most notable among his many published works, see Marc Galanter, Reading the
Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About
Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983).
189. See, e.g., David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72 (1983).
190. See ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS: SUPPLEMENTAL TABLES (annual publication containing 92
statistical tables); FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS, supra note 4.
191. NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS
(annual publication).
192. Rand Corporation's major cost and delay studies include: JANE W. ADLER ET AL.,
SIMPLE JUSTICE: How LITIGANTS FARE IN THE PITTSBURGH COURT ARBITRATION
PROGRAM (1983) (reviewing efficiency, accuracy, and litigant satisfaction with the court-
administered arbitration program); PATRICIA A. EBENER ET AL., COURT EFFORTS To
REDUCE PRETRIAL DELAY: A NATIONAL INVENTORY (1981) (reviewing state court tech-
niques used to reduce pretrial delay); JOHN B. JENNINGS, THE DESIGN AND EVALUATION
886
1994] Civil Procedure Reform 887
ter,193 and the National Center for State Courts' 94 conduct
OF EXPERIMENTAL COURT REFORMS (1971) (analyzing individual court reforms and
advocating the use of controlled, small-scale experiments); JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL.,
AVERTING GRIDLOCK: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING CIVIL DELAY IN THE LOS ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT (1990) (noting the causes of and straiegies for reducing delay in the Los
Angeles Superior Courts); JAMES S. KAKALIK & NICHOLAS M. PACE, COSTS AND
COMPENSATION PAID IN TORT LITIGATION (1986) (reviewing total and component costs
of resolving tort lawsuits in courts of general jurisdiction); JAMES S. KAKALIK & ABBY
EISENSHTAT ROBYN, COSTS OF THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM: COURT EXPENDITURES FOR
PROCESSING TORT CASES (1982) (reviewing the factors that determine how much money
is spent and noting court expenditures); E. ALLAN LIND ET AL., THE PERCEPTION OF
JUSTICE: TORT LITIGANTS' VIEWS OF TRIAL, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION, AND
JUDICIAL SEITLEMENT CONFERENCES (1989) (examining how tort litigants perceive courts
and what factors create the most satisfying results); GEORGE L. PRIEST, REGULATING
THE CONTENT AND VOLUME OF LITIGATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1983) (examining
how shifting litigation costs from one party to another influences the volume of litigation);
MOLLY SELVIN & PATRICIA A. EBENER, MANAGING THE UNMANAGEABLE: A HISTORY
OF CIVIL DELAY IN THE LOS ANGELES SUPERIOR COURT (1984) (reviewing delay history
and effective delay-reducing procedures).
193. See generally Russell Wheeler, Empirical Research and the Politics of Judicial
Administration: Creating the Federal Judicial Center, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31
(1988). The Center's major cost-and-delay studies include: PAUL R. CONNOLLY ET AL.,
JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: DISCOVERY (1978)
(reviewing, empirically, the measures judges use to manage and control the civil discovery
process); PAUL R. CONNOLLY & PATRICIA A. LOMBARD, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE
CIVIL LITIGATION PROCESS: MOTIONS (1980) (reporting on the dynamics affecting delay
and productivity in district courts' management of motions practice); STEVEN FLANDERS,
CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT IN UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
(1977) (studying ten courts to determine what procedures are associated with efficiency,
speed, and justice) [hereinafter CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT];
STEVEN FLANDERS, THE 1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY (1980) (reporting
on the measure of district courts' workloads in order to improve resource allocation); J.L.
EBERSOLE, PLANNING AND ORGANIZING A COURT STUDY (1973) (describing how to
analyze problems of courts and develop and successfully implement plans for change); E.
ALLAN LIND & JOHN E. SHAPARD, EVALUATION OF COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION
IN THREE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS (1983) (showing that court-annexed arbitration
substantially reduces the proportion of cases that go to trial); NORTH AMERICAN
ROCKWELL INFORMATION SYSTEMS CO., SUMMARY OF A MANAGEMENT AND SYSTEMS
SURVEY OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS (1969) (describing how to analyze problems of
courts and develop and successfully implement plans for change).
194. Its major cost and delay studies include: THOMAS CHURCH, JR. ET AL., PRETRIAL
DELAY: A REVIEW AND BIBLIOGRAPHY (1978) (reviewing empirical studies of pretrial
delay in general jurisdiction courts, and assessing causes, consequences, and cures); Church
et al., supra note 174, at 3 (examining elements affecting pretrial delay through a
comparison of criminal and civil courts of varying speeds); WILLIAM E. HEWITT ET AL.,
COURTS THAT SUCCEED: SIX PROFILES OF SUCCESSFUL COURTS (1990) (noting profiles
of management programs of six successful metropolitan trial courts); BARRY MAHONEY
ET AL., NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, IMPLEMENTING DELAY REDUCTION AND
DELAY PREVENTION PROGRAMS IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS (1985) (studying case-
processing times in eighteen state trial courts of general jurisdiction); MAHONEY, supra
note 29 (three-year study of case processing in eighteen urban trial courts); ON TRIAL:
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empirical research on U.S. court system. The American Bar
Association, through its Task Force on Reduction of Litigation
Cost and Delay, has helped design a program to reduce judical
delay.195 It has also publicized judicial experiments and court
reform efforts through its Judicial Administration Division. '
The Institute for Court Management of the National Center for
State Courts publishes the Justice System Journal, which has
featured several seminal empirical works on civil justice delay"1 7
B. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990
It is not surprising, then, that Congress based the Civil Justice
Reform Act of 1990 ("Reform Act") on empirical findings. 9
Congress enacted this law to "facilitate deliberat[e] adjudication of
civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation
management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions
of civil disputes."' 99
1. The Reform Act"
While the Italian Parliament directly modified the delay- and
cost-inducing rules in the Code of Civil Procedure, the U.S.
Congress delegated that task to federal court judges and litiga-
THE LENGTH OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL TRIALS (1988) (examining determinants of trial
length in three trial courts).
195. See, e.g., MAUREEN SOLOMON & DOUGLAS K. SOMERLOT, CASEFLOW
MANAGEMENT IN THE TRIAL COURT (1987) (summarizing the state of the art in trial court
management); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, DEFEATING DELAY: DEVELOPING AND
IMPLEMENTING A COURT DELAY REDUCTION PROGRAM (1986); AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
ATTACKING LITIGATION COSTS AND DELAY (1984).
196. See, e.g., Eve Lieber, Maximum Case Management with Minimum Judge Time, 25
JUDGES' J. 14 (1986); Ernest C. Friesen, Cures for Court Congestion, 23 JUDGES' J. 4
(1984); Hilda R. Gage, How To Reduce the Docket, 23 JUDGES' J. 12 (1984); Howard
Schwartz, Delay: How Kansas and Phoenix Are Making It Disappear, 23 JUDGES' J. 22
(1984).
197. See, e.g., John A. Goerdt, Explaining the Pace of Civil Case Litigation: The Latest
Evidence from 37 Large Urban Trial Courts, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 289 (1991); Thomas W.
Church, Jr., Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST. SyS. J. 166 (1978).
198. 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (1990).
199. Id. § 471.
200. See generally Carl Tobias, Judicial Oversight of Civil Justice Reform, 140 F.R.D.
49 (1992); Carl Tobias, Civil Justice Reform Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507, 508-12 (1992). For
a seemingly bitter tirade against this legislation, including challenges to its empirical
foundations and participatory pretensions, see Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation
in Procedural Justice, 77 MINN. L. REV. 375 (1992).
888 [Vol. 16:861
Civil Procedure Reform
tors.2" Congress believed that operational rules should be de-
vised from below rather than imposed from above.' Thus, the
Reform Act mandated the creation of ninety-four advisory groups,
each representing one federal district court, to draft specially
designed delay- and cost-reduction plans.' The Act required
these committees to be "balanced," in order to maintain a cross-
section of the legal community."6 Thus, they included represen-
tatives of major categories of litigants in each court. The commit-
tees were to develop their recommendations only after conducting
"a thorough assessment of the court's civil and criminal dockets
[that] identif[ied] the principal causes of cost and delay in civil
litigation." 2°5  After determining the particular needs of each
court, the committees assessed the needs of the attorneys and their
clients.2 6 The Staff Director of the Senate Judiciary Committee
described "user involvement" as the "linchpin" of the Act.207 He
also described the information collection and dissemination process
as one of unprecedented proportions.2 '6
Never before has every federal district court been required, in
effect, to take a look inward to collect data on its performance
and to engage in a dialogue on litigation management with
lawyers and clients who appear regularly in court.'
It would be difficult to find a better example of U.S. empiri-
cism at work. First, reform must consider the characteristics
peculiar to each court as revealed by factual inquiry. The advisory
group will rely on its wide range of experiences and special data-
gathering efforts to gather the facts. 210 Ideally, the facts will re-
veal the "causes" of excessive cost and delay in a particular court
and suggest solutions. A Manual for Litigation Management and
201. See 28 U.S.C. § 472 (1990) (development and implementation by district courts,
advised by lawyers, of expense and delay reduction measures).
202. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990) ("[S]olutions ... must include significant contributions
by the courts, the litigants, the litigants' attorneys ... .
203. 28 U.S.C. § 478 (1990).
204. Id. § 478(b).
205. Id. § 472(c)(1).
206. Id. § 472(c)(2).
207. See Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 54 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 105, 105 (1991).
208. Id. at 113.
209. Id.
210. See 28 U.S.C. § 472(c) (1990).
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Cost and Delay Reduction will synthesize each individual plan.2 1
Because empiricists realize that reality never remains constant,
they will continuously supervise and improve all plans.
2 12
Congress listed a series of "principles, 213  and "tech-
niques '' 21 that the districts "shall consider and may include" for
guidance. For the most part, these methods proved successful in
various courts across the country.215  While many strongly advo-
cated the use of these techniques, Congress did not presume that
each or any one of them suited all courts. 216  In the spirit of
"bottom up" reforming, Congress offered these ideas merely as
local options.
21"
The Reform Act also reflects the U.S. penchant for public
inspection of the performance of government officials in its "sun-
shine statutes., 21'  Biannual reports must reveal abnormal delays
in terminating cases (over three years), in disposing of motions
(over six months), and in issuing judgments in bench trials (over
six months after submission). 19
Congress swiftly enacted the legislation. Less than one year
passed between introduction of the original reform bill and passage
211. 28 U.S.C. 9 479(c)(1) (1990). See LITIGATION MANAGEMENT MANUAL (Federal
Judicial Center ed., 1992).
212. 28 U.S.C. §§ 475, 479 (1990).
213. Id. § 473(a).
214. Id. § 473(b).
215. The list included: creating special procedural tracks according to relative case com-
plexity; early and ongoing pretrial management; setting early, firm trial dates; periodic
management conferences for complex cases; voluntary fact disclosure; certificates of good-
faith efforts to resolve discovery disputes; referral of disputes to alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR") programs; requiring attorneys to develop discovery and case man-
agement plans without court intervention; requirements that attorneys appear at pretrial
conferences with authority to bind clients (or, for settlement conferences, that clients be
readily available to consent); use of neutral evaluations to promote settlement; and
requirements that parties agree to their lawyers' requests for postponements. Id. § 473(a).
216. See 28 U.S.C. § 102(1) (1990) (problem assessment in the "context" of each district
court).
217. Because Congress also wanted some testing, it must include in the plan six of the
"principles and guidelines" in ten "pilot" district courts. See Judicial Improvements Act
of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(b), reprinted in Tobias, supra note 200, at n.5.
218. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1990) (stating that federal agency meetings shall be open
to public observation).
219. See id. § 476 (1990); ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF U.S. COURTS, CIVIL JUSTICE
REFORM ACT: REPORT OF MOTIONS PENDING OVER SIX MONTHS, BENCH TRIALS
SUBMITTED OVER Six MONTHS, CIVIL CASES PENDING OVER THREE YEARS ON MARCH
31, 1993, at 5 (14,001 motions; 186 bench trials; 13,224 cases).
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of the finalized Reform Act.220 In contrast, the Italian Parlia-
ment considered reforming the code of procedure for more than
a decade,22 and worked intensively for two years on the techni-
cal language of the bill that amended the code.22
Despite its quick enactment, the Reform Act was well-
grounded in careful empirical investigation. A polling organization
representing all sectors of the federal bar conducted a survey to
determine the existence, nature, extent, and causes of federal court
delay and costs.' The 1,100 respondents to this survey support-
ed many of the ideas for procedural improvement inventoried in
the Reform Act.' In addition, pursuant to Senator Joseph
Biden's request, the Brookings Institution sponsored a widely-
representative task force, which produced a report that influenced
the original shape of the .legislation.225 The structuring of the
survey and the discussion accompanying the Brookings Task
Force's proposals bear the heavy imprint of empirical findings
generated by court research in the preceding decades.
2. The Civil Justice Reform Plans
Pursuant to the recommendations of the Brookings Task
Force" and the mandate of the Reform Act,227 each of the
ninety-four federal courts has completed a study and adopted a
plan, containing operational rules and processes, to combat cost
and delay.22 This Article will review the work of two courts: one
is representative of a busy metropolitan court; the other typifies
220. See Peck, supra note 207, at 106.
221. See supra text accompanying note 34.
222. See supra text accompanying notes 35-46.
223. See Procedural Reform of the Civil Justice System (1989), reprinted in Hearings on
the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 and the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990 before the
Senate Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 91 (1990) [hereinafter Civil Justice
Reform Act].
224. Id. at 96-97, 99.
225. BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, JUSTICE FOR ALL:
REDUCING COSTS AND DELAY IN CIVIL LITIGATION (1989), reprinted in Civil Justice
Reform Act, supra note 223, at 421-73. See Peck, supra note 207, at 107.
226. See BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 225, at 438-
40.
227. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (1990).
228. For a summary of the plans and reports of thirty-four districts, see JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT REPORT:
DEVELOPMENT AND IMPLEMENTATION OF PLANS BY EARLY IMPLEMENTATION DISTRICTS
AND PILOT COURTS (1992).
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the slower, more deliberate pace in a smaller, more tightly knit
community.
a. Eastern District of Pennsylvania ("EDPA")
The EDPA followed its congressional instructions to the
letter. It issued a report on August 1, 1991,229 after six months
of intense activity by a twenty-two-member advisory group, and
adopted a "Civil Justice Expense and Delay Reduction Plan,"
which came into effect on December 31, 1991.230 To assess
EDPA's past and present performance and to anticipate future
developments, the advisory group studied statistical data generated
by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts.231 The
facts revealed that the court worked diligently to process a signifi-
cant case load.232  Facing the largest number of filings" and
the third most complex caseload' in the nation, the EDPA
bench of sixteen active judges, seven below the number of
authorized judgeships, 5 processed all cases in a median time of
seven months-sixth best 'nationally.236 EDPA disposed of cases
requiring a trial in a median disposition time of twelve months,
twenty-first out of the ninety-four federal trial courts.237
The EDPA judges, however, faced inherent burdens that
impeded their delay-reducing efforts. Their "weighted"" 8
229. REPORT OF THE ADVISORY GROUP OF THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA (Aug. 1, 1991), reprinted in 138 F.R.D.
167 (1991) [hereinafter EDPA REPORT].
230. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVA-
NIA, CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1991) [hereinafter EDPA
PLAN].
231. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 284-302.
232. The EDPA uses an individual calendar system, under which cases are randomly
assigned to judges on a rotational basis and each judge is solely responsible for that case
from beginning to end. Under such a system, each judge's performance can be subject to
statistical analysis. This system has been shown to increase productivity. See Thomas W.
Church, Jr., Civil Case Delay in State Trial Courts, 4 JUST. SYS. J. 166, 177-78 (1978).
233. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 191. In 1990, the court received 9,271 new
filings, almost 600 per active judge. Id. at 108, 205 (stating that sixteen active judges
presided at EDPA).
234. Id. at 192-93 (stating that the average weighted caseload was 638 cases per judge).
235. Id. at 205.
236. Id. at 8.
237. Id.
238. The term "'weighted" means that the case number was adjusted to reflect the com-
plexity of some cases.
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caseload per judge stood at 638, third highest in the United
States,2 9 and total filings were projected to increase steadily in
the next decade.2' The court continued to hear a high percent-
age (15.4%) of the country's complicated, time-consuming asbestos
cases,24 1 which threatened to increase significantly the number of
cases that would remain on the court's docket for more than three
years.242 Despite EDPA's high productivity rate, the steady
increase in case filings and the lack of sufficient staff resulted in
backlog.24 3 Also, EPDA anticipated that a district policy "adopt-
ing" drug and firearm criminal cases from the state system,2"
predictions of increased civil rights filings by prisoners,24 5 and
time demands of new sentencing processes' would add extra
strains. In sum, while EDPA had compiled an extraordinary
disposition record in the decades preceding 1990, the advisory
group perceived constant "threats" to the system's well-being and
a "real" risk of retrogression.247
The EDPA advisory group used questionnaires, interviews,
public meetings, and its own collective experiences to determine
EDPA practices that produced cost and delay and to solicit ideas
for reform.2 " Ironically, the EDPA group questioned the data
generated in this manner 249 and generally refused to ground its
recommendations on anecdotes and undocumented assertions. For
example, lawyers complained of unnecessary judicial conferences
and delay in deciding dispositive motions.25 Judges accused
lawyers of proliferating motions and arguments to generate billable
hours.251 The advisory group also heard that EDPA judges were
reluctant to impose sanctions because of the time drain caused by
briefing and hearing these ancillary matters.252  This type of
239. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 192.
240. Id. at 288, attachment 5.
241. Id. at 197-98.
242. Id. at 194.
243. Id. at 290, attachment 7 (8,902 pending July 1, 1989; 9,784 pending July 1, 1990).
244. Id. at 200-02.
245. Id. at 199.
246. Id. at 202-04.
247. Id. at 191 tbl. 1 (indicating that the median filing-to-disposition times decreased
from 32 months in 1970 to 7 months in 1990).
248. Id. at 219-22.
249. Id. at 185 (citing no pretension of "assured empirical findings").
250. Id. at 225.
251. Id. at 226.
252. Id. at 220.
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information, however, was not "hard empirical evidence, '"" and
the group decried, "how little we do know."
The group did manage, however, to reach a humble 5
consensus on a few points: (1) excessive delay generates additional
costs as lawyers refamiliarize themselves with files and take
marginally valuable depositions;" (2) early settlements reduce
the defendants' billable hours and the fees that plaintiffs' attorneys
charge; 7 and (3) "the single most serious cause of cost and
delay" was inadequate numbers of judges, 8 followed by abusive
and excessive discovery. 9
The EDPA Advisory Group recommended a series of actions
based upon its findings. All of the group's recommendations were
incorporated into the district's final plan.
The first recommendation was to create a "special track" for
complex cases demanding more intensive individual manage-
ment.260 These "special" cases would be subjected to careful
planning and multiple conferences, including one held primarily to
discuss settlement.26'
253. Id. at 235.
254. Id. at 236.
255. Id. at 185-86.
We do not pretend that all of our conclusions are supported by assured empirical
findings. We have cast our net wide, bringing in all of the anecdotal experiences
of all of the judges in this court, most of the litigants and practitioners before the
court and the collect[ed] experience of a widely diversified composite of the trial
lawyers of the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. We are satisfied that ... we
have produced a consensus of views of this Advisory Group that represents our
best judgment under the mandate the [Reform] Act has given us.
Id
256. Id. at 223.
257. Id. at 224.
258. Id. at 232-33. Adding judges to a court may cause a decrease in individual judge
productivity, leaving the system without improved performance. See Church et al., supra
note 174, at 191.
259. Id. at 234-35.
260. Id. at 239-45. See also EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at 5-8 (adopting rule for
management tracks). A seminal study has demonstrated significant productivity increases
resulting from automatic, rigorous judicial case management. See CASE MANAGEMENT
AND COURT MANAGEMENT, supra note 193, at ch. 3.
261. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 255-59. See also EDPA PLAN, supra note 230,
at 11-13 (regulating special management process); id. at 16 (describing joint discovery-case
management plans). Surprisingly, empirical studies do not show a significant correlation
between active settlement promotion by judges and increases in productivity. See
CHURCH, supra note 194, at 174-76; CASE MANAGEMENT AND COURT MANAGEMENT,
supra note 193, at 37-39.
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For "standard" cases, pretrial judicial involvement would
include a telephonic pretrial conference and a resulting scheduling
order setting deadlines for party joinder, pleading amendments,
filing and hearing motions, and completing discovery.262 The
scheduling order would also set a specific month for trial, normally
twelve months from the date of filing, with continuances granted
only for compelling reasons.263 This impending, immovable trial
date would encourage lawyers to consider the option of settlement
more seriously.2"
Despite the reluctance of a significant number of EDPA
lawyers,265 the Reform Act's mandate that "voluntary exchange
of information among litigants" be considered2" resulted in a
proposal,2 67 and then a rule which requires early disclosure and
supplementation of witnesses, documents, and information bearing
significantly on claims and defenses, including disclosure of
relevant insurance coverage.
2 68
Because the Reform Act was constructed from actual federal
court experiences and practices, it is not surprising that some of its
provisions reflect methods already followed by the Eastern District
of Pennsylvania. For example, the Reform Act mandated that
attorneys should consider negotiating solutions to discovery
disputes before seeking court orders.269 The EDPA had already
required similar certifications for some time.27° Congress also
required district courts to consider the use of alternative dispute
resolution ("ADR"). The EDPA had pioneered mandatory
arbitration of small claims before lawyer panels271 and had
already conducted controlled experiments in settlement mediation
262. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 247. See also EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at
9.
263. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 248-51. See also EDPA PLAN, supra note 230,
at 9-11.
264. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 248.
265. Id. at 260.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(4) (1990).
267. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 260-62.
268. See EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at 13-15. Some accommodation will have to be
made to the federal disclosure rule, FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1), which has significantly
different language. See AMENDMENTS To THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
AND FORMS, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 431-36 (1993).
269. 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (1990).
270. E.D. PA. R. 24(0. See EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at 15.
271. See E.D. PA. R. 8. See generally LIND & SHAPARD, supra note 193.
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by local lawyers. 272 The advisory group declined to recommend
more ADR than was already being conducted in the EDPA at that
time. 273  A third provision required parties to be present or
readily available at settlement conferences. This was suggested by
the Reform Act,274 but was already in effect in the EDPA for the
final pretrial conference.275 The local rule needed only slight
broadening.76
What the advisory group did not recommend is of consider-
able interest. For example, national statistics indicated that
discovery abuse was the most significant cause of excessive civil
litigation costs.277  In addition, the Reform Act mandated that
EDPA consider controlling the extent of discovery.278 EDPA
planners had considered imposing absolute limits on the number
of discovery requests and/or the time of a deposition but rejected
these limits "because [the planners were] not convinced that such
a rule would reduce costs or delay without at the same time
limiting the right of the litigant to prepare its case fully."2 79
Instead, EDPA planners relied upon the sanctions in the federal
rules to prevent frivolous and meritless discovery, as long as
district court judges would use them. 80
The advisory group also declined to implement an expansive
role for discovery-case management plans mandated by Congress
to be considered and developed by attorneys.2" While such
plans were appropriate for "special track" cases,2 the advisory
group believed that their indiscriminate use would threaten to add
costs to simpler cases.'
272. See E.D. PA. R. 15.
273. EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 266.
274. 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(5) (1990).
275. See E.D. PA. R. 21(d)(3).
276. See EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at 17.
277. See Civil Justice Reform Act, supra note 223, at 95.
278. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(2)(c) (1990).
279. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 251. The EDPA will need to reassess its
position in light of new rule limits on the number of interrogatories and depositions. See
FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 33(a), reprinted in AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, supra note 268, at 649-50, 672-73.
280. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 251.
281. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(1) (1990).
282. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 255-57; EDPA PLAN, supra note 230, at
16.
283. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 269.
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Finally, EDPA planners emphatically rejected a congressional-
ly mandated consideration that clients sign-off on requests for
postponements.2 4  This provision reflected a distrust of the
attorney-client relationship for which the group could "find no ba-
sis.,,
2S5
b. The District of South Dakota
The picture that emerged in the District of South Dakota
("DSD"), a sparsely populated, mostly rural jurisdiction, starkly
contrasts with the experience of EDPA. The judges and lawyers
in DSD needed little procedural reform because the existing
machinery already exhibited remarkable judicial efficiency. The
advisory group's sanguine report stated:
[T]he District has a tradition of hardworking Judges and Senior
Judges and a District bar that is marked by a high degree of
experience, skill and civility .... Under the traditional model
of civil litigation, the lawyers, as adversaries supervised by an
impartial court, are the primary vehicles for making the civil
litigation system operate in a "just, speedy, and inexpensive"
manner .... In the District for South Dakota, the elements of
the traditional model are working skillfully and efficiently.m
The DSD advisory group consisted of two federal judges, ten
partners from South Dakota's major law firms, one legal services
attorney, the court clerk, a deputy attorney general, the district's
U.S. Attorney, and one law professor-reporter.' Clients or cli-
ent groups, sole practitioners, and public interest lawyers did not
serve on the DSD advisory group.' The group's consultation
included a carefully-designed survey of 495 South Dakota practitio-
ners,289 review of statistical materials, interviews with judges, and
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(3) (1990).
285. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 271.
286. CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT ADVISORY GROUP REPORT FOR THE DISTRICT OF
SOUTH DAKOTA, reprinted in 148 F.R.D. 393, 396 (1993) [hereinafter DSD REPORT].
287. In contrast to Italy, where law professors lead law reform efforts, academics in the
United States are typically relegated to the role of reporting the work of judges and
practitioners. One suspects that this is because of professors' distance from actual court
operations, suggesting an inability to contribute significantly, and their perceived light
workloads, meaning time available for drafting reports.
288. See DSD REPORT, supra note 286, app. A, at 413-20.
289. See id. app. C, at 423-25 (discussing survey planning, questionnaire preparation,
selection of research population, and response rate); id. app. C, at 425-39 (reporting survey
results).
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intra-group communications at four meetings.2' Needless to say,
on topics such as excessive litigation costs, the billers (lawyers)
found no problems.2 9 The group was not oblivious to its lack of
client input; it stated that its future efforts would include participa-
tion of "two or more lay persons."292
The data revealed a situation in South Dakota that was
luxurious when compared to the situation in Eastern Pennsylvania.
Filings declined, terminations exceeded filings, and the number of
pending cases dropped from 519 in 1988 to 448 in 1992.293 The
advisory group observed no trends threatening to disturb this
trouble-free docket.2'
Excessive delay and workload did not cause problems. Only
two cases-one percent of DSD's docket-had been pending for
more than three years. 295 From filing to disposition, DSD
terminated cases in a median time of eight months. 296  The
District enjoyed the third lightest average caseload in the coun-
try--only 209 cases per judge.2' Even more surprising, the
caseload per judge was declining.29 Furthermore, the DSD
advisory group's study revealed no problem with larger, complex
cases.
299
Not surprisingly, the Advisory Group recommended few
changes, citing the adage "If it ain't broke, don't fix it."3°  The
group could find no significant reason to establish management
tracks, special procedures for complex cases, party sign-off on
continuance requests, early neutral evaluation-"an expensive
290. See id. app. B, at 420-23.
291. See id at 401 (stating that "[miost of the survey data flatly refutes any suggestion
that the District is experiencing excessive costs," and asserting that "the experienced
lawyers who compose the Advisory Group have not observed either delay or cost prob-
lems").
292. Id. at 410.
293. Id. at 397.
294. Id. at 399.
295. Id. at 398.
296. Id. Although, the planning group called this a "remarkably low time frame," this
statement is hyperbolic, as the busy EDPA was beating DSD by a month. See supra text
accompanying note 236. The national average was also eight months. See ADMINIS-
TRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT
STATISTICS: 1988, at 167 (1988).
297. DSD REPORT, supra note 286, at 398.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 404.
300. Id. at 403.
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bureaucratic program, ' ' 30 mandatory discovery ex-
change-already part of the District's "rich tradition of civility," or
mandatory ADR.?
IV. CONCLUSION
The style of reform determines the "stylists." In Italy, where
the actual impact of rules in the courts is vaguely known, the front-
line practitioners-trial lawyers-seem to have played a minor
role. The judges exerted more influence in reform. °3  The
academicians, the chief actors in the 1990 overhaul of the Code,
dominated the process directly as legislators and indirectly as
advisors.' Because reform proceeded deductively from the face
of the Code, rather than inductively from the reality of the Italian
courts, law professors-masters of deduction and logic-naturally
assumed a leading role. In the Italian Parliamentary debates, there
is a deference to and respect and admiration for professors, bred
in the student-professor relationship and bolstered in later years by
the dominance of doctrinal thinking.' 5 In the post-reform years,
the academicians maintain their hegemony by means of published
glosses on the text 3°6 and lectures to bar associations.
3 7
In stark contrast, U.S. law professors played virtually no role
in the creation and implementation of civil justice reform. Advi-
sory groups in the United States excluded professors from the
respondent list for the national survey, an instrumental factor in
the development of the Reform Act." Only five professors sat
on the thirty-six member Brookings Task Force on Civil Justice
Reform that produced the influential report girding the Reform
301. Id. at 405.
302. See id. at 404-10.
303. The thoughtful report of the Superior Council on the Judiciary on earlier legisla-
tion had a substantial impact on the law that was finally approved. Many of its recom-
mendations were adopted. See CSM FIRST REPORT, supra note 25.
304. Even the group advising the Superior Council on the Judiciary had substantial par-
ticipation by the university. See CSM FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at cols. 391-92
(stating that six of the eighteen members of the group were professors of civil procedure).
305. See JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION 59-72 (1969); Perillo, supra
note 76, at 284 (stating that top lawyers employ "legal dogmatics").
306. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 178-81.
307. See, e.g., ORDINE AWvOCATI E PROCURATORI DI VENEZIA, SEMINARI DI STUDIO
SUL TEMA: LA RIFORMA DEL PROCESSO CIVILE [STUDY SEMINARS ON THE THEME: THE
REFORM OF CIVIL PROCESS] 5-23, 43-63, 101-14 (1991).
308. See Civil Justice Reform Act, supra note 223, at 92 (citing in-depth telephone
interviews with 1,047 litigators, corporate counsels and judges).
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Act.' Not a single professor testified at the Senate hearings or
submitted written correspondence.31 In the two federal district
court advisory groups examined, only one law professor appeared
in each, as the scribe.311
This U.S. exclusion of academicians is a predictable outgrowth
of U.S. legal realism. Experts on court matters, namely judges and
practitioners, master not theory but facts. Their insights are bred
by experience. Law professors in the United States, on the other
hand, are typically full-time teachers who are prohibited from
practicing law in any substantial way. In contrast, the European
legal academic typically practices full-time while delivering daily
lectures at the university. Thus, the European academic can claim
a mastery of fact, legal experiences, theory, and his published
works.
The Italians worked on a set of amendments that would
uniformly apply to the hundreds of judicial offices in the national
system. The lack of court-specific data encouraged the reformers
in Italy to presume that substantially similar problems existed
throughout the country, and that a single set of solutions would
solve these problems. The U.S. reformers, in comparison, have
learned from empirical research that each jurisdiction possesses a
unique "legal culture" that determines the manner in which cases
are processed. This naturally led to a focus on local reforms,
represented by the ninety-four court-specific plans generated by
the Reform Act. This "precision" in focus contributes to a
balkanization of U.S. procedure within the supposedly unitary
federal system, a development strongly decried.312 Yet, to some
extent, the models for improvement displayed in the Reform Act
and fleshed out in implementation packets313 and manuals"'
will maintain some similarity among federal judicial districts
because procedure is rooted in the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
309. See BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 225, at 469-
73 (listing members of the task force).
310. See Civil Justice Reform Act, supra note 223, at ii-iv.
311. See EDPA REPORT, supra note 229, at 168, 317-24 (Professor A. Leo Levin,
Reporter); DSD REPORT, supra note 286, at 394, 413-20 (Professor David S. Day,
Reporter).
312. See Mullenix, supra note 200, at 380-82.
313. See, e.g., JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, MODEL CIVIL JUSTICE
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN (1992).
314. See supra note 211.
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dure.3 5 Because case inflow dramatically differs in volume and
content, as between the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the
District of South Dakota, a principle of procedural uniformity
faces much opposition."6 While a single procedural code may
theoretically find support as a force unifying a nation, the constant
mismatch of theory and practice may prove too costly.
In Italian legal culture, the judge does not receive substantial
respect." 7 Italian legal culture perceives judges as essentially
law-applying bureaucrats, much like functionaries processing
applications for public assistance." 8 Highly detailed rules legisla-
tively control Italian judges, and this explains the extraordinary
level of detail one finds in the more than twelve hundred articles
comprising the Italian Code of Civil Procedure. 9 Consequently,
reform will consist of more and, hopefully, better rules with even
greater detail. Italian legal culture perceived judges as contribu-
tors to the problem of cost and delay in civil justice. From this
perspective, the reformers imposed many more affirmative duties
on the judges.320
In comparison, the federal judiciary in the United States
enjoys greater respect. Judges, noted for their hard work and
considerable skill, typically come from the top ranks of the legal
profession. It is therefore natural for the profession's leaders to
vest judges with considerable discretion in managing their case-
loads in ways that will meet established goals. In the federal
procedural system, one invariably encounters procedures matched
with exemption power vested in the judge. Federal judges are
315. See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (governing "all" suits of a civil nature before federal district
courts); see also id. at 83 (district court local rules may not be "inconsistent" with Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure). Recent amendments to the Federal Rules undercut uniformity
by offering districts an "opt out" option. See e.g., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS, supra note 268, at 431; FED. R. CIv. P. 26(2)(1)
("except to the extent otherwise... directed by... local rule").
316. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 416, supra note 183, at 15 (plans should meet "needs and de-
mands of local conditions").
317. See generally Mary L. Volcansek, The Judicial Role in Italy: Independence, Impar-
tiality and Legitimacy, 73 JUDICATURE 322 (1990).
318. See generally Giuseppe di Federico, The Italian Judicial Profession and Its Bureau-
cratic Setting, 21 JURID. REV. 40 (1976).
319. This detail stems from a deep-seated fear of arbitrariness, as well as an exaltation
of certainty in the law, both strains of thought deeply embedded in Italian legal theory.
See Merryman, The Italian Style I, supra note 7, at 61-62.
320. Even in the field of juvenile justice, the Italian emphasis is on the strict application
of formal rules and the denial of discretion to judges. See Lemert, supra note 1.
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expected to employ their wisdom and experience in determining
when to vary the application of a general rule in the U.S. federal
legal system. Little fear is shown of misuse of such discretionary
power because of a generally high regard for the independence,
integrity, and skill of the federal judges. In sum, Italian judges
apply the rules while, at least in the context of procedure, U.S.
federal judges apply guided discretion.
One also senses a distinct, business-like approach in the U.S.
manner of reforming civil procedure. This dispute may be
analogized to a complex business problem. The product, a just
decision, is to be achieved with an optimally efficient use of
available resources so that profit, i.e., the generation of additional
capacity in the court system, results. The performance of the
enterprise is publicly judged by its productivity: disposition rates,
median processing times, and so forth. These measures are also
used to evaluate the workers on the production line-the judges.
Periodic public appraisal is made possible by the generation and
publication of annual statistical reports,"' similar to a company's
annual reports and periodic earnings statements.
From this perspective, it is natural for the United States to
reform its system to expand the judge's role. In addition to neu-
trally applying legal norms to facts generated by the parties, judges
must manage the dispute so that the norm-to-fact process evolves
efficiently. Judges must eliminate unnecessary discovery, excise
marginal issues quickly, regularly apply short-cuts like summary
judgment," avoid repetitive testimony, grant continuances
sparingly, impose and enforce deadlines, and punish frivolous
assertions. Congress, in 1993, added the word "administered" to
Federal Rule 1 to emphasize this judicial role: "These rules shall
be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."3" The Advisory
Committee on the Federal Rules explained that the amendment
would "recognize the affirmative duty of the court to exercise the
321. See supra note 4.
322. See Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986) (summary judgment is an integral
part of Federal Rules); JAMES FLEMMING, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 207 (4th ed.
1992) (Celotex "reveals a stance much more supportive of summary judgment").
323. See AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND FORMS,
supra note 268, at 535.
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authority conferred by these rules to insure that civil litigation is
resolved not only fairly, but also without undue cost or delay."
324
This "U.S. model" has considerable risks.325 The manage-
ment role of the federal judge constantly threatens his judicial
capacity. In the course of controlling the dispute process, the
judge makes multiple discretionary "management" choices, such as
the setting of deadlines and ruling on lawyers' excuses, that may
significantly impact the ultimate law-to-fact decision. The U.S.
courts, however, accept this risk because, in viewing the legal
system as a whole, norm-to-fact justice cannot be achieved in
costly, clogged courts.
A study of the Italian debates and results of civil justice
reform sparingly reflects this U.S. model. With median case-
processing time having reached fifteen years, 326 the Italian
Parliament could not ignore systemic concerns. The Italian
response aimed at efficiently organizing a case at the outset.327
Yet, one senses a futility in the effort. Forcing cases to march
more quickly and efficiently by adding rules and details may gener-
ate more disputes, more areas of conflicts, and more "creases in
the procedure '321 that crafty lawyers seeking tactical advantage
may exploit.
The Italian civil procedure reform of 1992 fully reflects Italy's
traditional, positivist approach. This approach views laws as a
composite of logically interrelated rules completely independent of
other disciplines such as sociology, philosophy, and even histo-
ry.329  The hopes of scholars that the "hardened mentality of
Italian lawyers ,331 would open up to input from other disciplines
and to the value of foreign experiences331 are not fueled by the
Italian processes of civil procedure reform; yet, the arid and
324. Id.
325. See generally Resnik, supra note 98.
326. See supra note 30.
327. See supra notes 62-77.
328. See supra text accompanying note 173.
329. See generally Giovanni Bognetti, The Judicial Process in Italy, 8 COMP. L. Y.B. 73,
73-80 (1984); Merryman, The Italian Style I, supra note 7, at 52-55; di Federico, supra note
318, at 44-46.
330. Bognetti, supra note 329, at 80.
331. See, e.g., Merryman, The Italian Style I, supra note 7, at 64-65; Bognetti, supra note
329, at 89. One finds in the Italian materials only an occasional reference to developments
abroad. See, e.g., CSM FIRST REPORT, supra note 25, at col. 397 (noting that France has
adopted the single-judge trial court).
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superficially technical area of procedure is, perhaps, not a
representative field for testing the opening of the Italian legal
mind.
Attaining speed and efficiency in the processing of civil cases
without compromising justice requires management tools.32 One
such tool is the collection and use of aggregate information about
the progress of cases on the docket; not simply case filings and
dispositions, but what occurs in between. To move cases along on
a firm schedule requires statistical knowledge of the troublespots,
such as overly generous grants of continuances or particularly
slow-moving judges. Empirical research conducted by U.S.
reformers adequately demonstrates this necessity.3 3 This re-
search also shows that, with accurate information and improved
management techniques, courts can make dramatic speed and
efficiency improvements, even in the face of growing caseloads. 3
The Italian proceduralist does not share the notion that
attaining efficiency requires management techniques.3 ' The
Italian belief that the formation of legal norms should not be
influenced by non-legal disciplines, such as business management,
seems immovable. Only this can explain the total apathy in
hundreds of pages of analysis and debates,3 36 about the absence
of data concerning the actual operations of Italian courts and an
obliviousness to the need for such information. Not surprisingly,
the resulting solution was the opposite: more theoretical work. The
grand rewriting of the Code of Civil Procedure filled everyone's
mind as the important next step.
33 7
The 1992 Italian civil procedure reform was but a stop-gap
measure, provoked by the imminent collapse of the civil courts.
The Italian legal system must formulate the next-generation code
systematically, on new analytical grounds. Failure of the Italian
reform will become evident a decade or so from now when Italy's
national data-gathering office publishes statistics showing an
332. See, e.g., MAHONEY, supra note 29, at 197-205 (describing ten main elements of
successful caseload management programs).
333. See, e.g., id. at 199-200; HEwITr ET AL., supra note 194, at 18-19, 37-38, 73-74, 95-
96, 121,150-51 (describing management information collected in six successful trial courts).
334. See MAHONEY, supra note 29, at 192-93.
335. See, e.g., CONSOLO ET AL., supra note 26, at 90 (Italian judges have had little
success in managing cases).
336. See supra text accompanying notes 38-46.
337. See, e.g., sources cited in supra note 34.
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increase in backlogs and delays. In contrast, the U.S. reform
includes built-in systems to measure its performance continuous-
ly.
338
338. See Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 105(c), 104 Stat.
5089 (1990) (uncodified). This Section calls for a comparison of pre-Act and post-Act
results in ten pilot districts, as well as a comparison with ten non-pilot districts. This study
is to be conducted by "an independent organization with expertise in the area of Federal
court management." Id. The Institute of Civil Justice of the Rand Corporation is
conducting the research with a report anticipated in the fall of 1995. Telephone Interview
with Mark Shapiro, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (Aug. 23, 1993).

